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O N April 16, 1980, a man using the name Marvin Goldstein
opened a bank account at a Baltimore branch of Union
Trust Company. He deposited $15,000 in cash. He told the
branch manager that he planned to establish a Baltimore office
of his father's New York business, "Goldstein's Precious Metals
and Stones." Goldstein identified himself with a New Jersey
driver's license and gave a bank reference from New York. On
May 6, Goldstein deposited a check for $880,000 at another
Union Trust branch near the branch where he had opened the
account. Words on this check indicated that it was drawn on
the account of Metropolitan Investment Corporation at First
Pennsylvania Bank, a large Philadelphia bank. Unbeknownst to
the Union Trust officers, the fractional numerals in the upper
right hand corner of the check identified Albany State Bank as
the payor, and the numerals at the bottom of the check were
gibberish: they identified no bank at all. Apparently Goldstein
had altered the numerals at the bottom for they were not
magnetic numerals, were of the wrong size and were nonsensical.
On most checks the name of the drawee, the fraction in the
upper right hand corner and the Magnetic Ink Character
Recognition ("MICR")-encoded numerals on the bottom-all
identify a payor.
Because the numerals on the bottom were not magnetically
encoded, the Union Trust machine could not read them and the
check had to be sent for collection manually. Accordingly, Union
Trust transferred it by courier to Philadelphia National Bank
(PNB). In apparent reliance on the numerical indication in the
fraction, PNB sent it to the New York Federal Reserve processing
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center in Utica, New York on May 7; Albany State received the
check on the morning of May 9. On May 10, Albany returned
it to the Utica center stamped "Sent in Error," and on May 13
it was returned to the New York Federal Reserve Bank's New
York City office. The New York Federal Reserve Bank then
sent it on May 14 to the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
for collection at First Pennsylvania. It was presented on May
14 at 9 a.m. at First Pennsylvania; First Pennsylvania notified
PNB of dishonor at 9:45 on the morning of May 16. PNB sent
word of dishonor to Union Trust in the middle of the afternoon
on May 16.
Unfortunately, Goldstein had come to Union Trust on May
15 to withdraw $95,000 in cash and to direct a wire transfer of
$660,000 to the account of a Maryland coin dealer. On May
16, Goldstein picked up his coins and disappeared. No one has
heard from him since.
I. THE CURSE
Goldstein's curse is the inability of the banking system to
distinguish between legitimate payment orders and fraudulent
ones. When checks were not widely used, and when bank
employees knew each depositor and recognized each signature,
it would have been impossible for Goldstein to have escaped
with $800,000.
To understand why the curse rests upon our system and why
we will not be able to exorcise it, consider the qualities that are
necessary for its existence. First is a high volume of transactions.
The American system handled more than forty-seven billion
checks in 1987,1 and the two principal wire payment systems,
Fedwire and Clearinghouse Interbank Payments System
("CHIPS"), transfer about one trillion dollars per day.2 If each
of those transactions had been handled by one with a
comprehensive knowledge of the practical and legal consequences
1. D. Humphrey & A. Berger, Market Failure and Resource Use: Eco-
nomic Incentives To Use Different Payment Instruments, table A-I (Apr.
1988) (paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Payments
System Symposium, Williamsburg, Va.).
2. Prefatory Note, Article 4A, reprinted in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY
MATERIALS, Ti EMERGING NEW UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Supp. Sept.
1989) [hereinafter TlE NEW U.C.C.].
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of each act, the system could not have worked. The volume of
transactions demands that a larger and larger share of the work
be done mechanically and electronically and that the human
labor come in a form that is highly specialized and semi-skilled.
Because most of the work must be done electronically or
mechanically, there must be a way to distinguish mechanically
or electronically between one account and another, one bank
and another, and one transaction and another. Whatever their
intelligence in the hands of a clever programmer, computers-
even those that can handle a large volume of transactions-are
notoriously rigid and highly restricted in their adaptability to
new information.
A second quality of our funds transfer system that feeds the
curse is its complexity. Few of the people associated with the
funds transfer system fully understand its operation. A person
who MICR encodes the dollar amounts on the check in the
basement of the depositary bank may be highly efficient at
doing that but is unlikely to be able to distinguish a drawer's
from an indorser's signature or to understand the legal
consequences of either. The person who operates the photographic
and sorting machine at the payor bank may have a detailed
knowledge about how the machine can become jammed or the
camera can breakdown, but is unlikely to understand that her
bank will be liable if it holds a check beyond the midnight
deadline. Those at the receiving bank who routinely enter
electronic funds transfers into various accounts identified by
number are blissfully ignorant of the fact that even though the
number on the electronic fund message and on the account may
be identical, the names on the two may be different. The
complexity, the volume, and the necessary compartmentalization
of the human activity in the system all feed Goldstein's curse.
Nor is the system likely to change in ways that will allow us
to be rid of it. Consider three events that have occurred within
the last twenty years that have magnified the impact of the
curse. First is MICR encoding. Almost all preprinted checks
have MICR encoding to identify the payor bank, the drawer's
account, the location of the payor and the type of instrument.
At the depositary bank, the payment amount is manually MICR
encoded at the bottom of the check.' The check is then fed into
3. For examples of how mistakes in manual MICR encoding can cause
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a machine that automatically sorts it, reads the dollar amount,
confusion, see First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity Bank, Nat'l Assoc., 724 F. Supp.
1168 (E.D. Pa. 1989); SOS Oil Corp. v. Norstar Bank, 152 A.D.2d 223, 548
N.Y.S.2d 308 (1989); Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust v. First Nat'i Bank & Trust
Co., 139 Ga. App. 638, 229 S.E.2d 482 (1976), aff'd, 238 Ga. 693, 235 S.E.2d
1 (1977).
In First National Bank, the depositary bank encoded a $100,000 check as
a $10,000 check. 728 F. Supp. at 1169. The payor bank paid $10,000 shortly
before the drawer's account was closed. Holding that the payor would have
been liable had sufficient funds remained in the drawer's account, the court
nevertheless freed the payor bank from liability since the account had been
closed. Id. at 1172-73.
In SOS Oil Corp., the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
came to the opposite conclusion. It found the payor bank liable for the
difference between the encoded amount and the actual amount on the ground
that the payor had held the check beyond its midnight deadline without paying
or settling and thus had liability under U.C.C. § 4-302 (1987). 152 A.D.2d at
225, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
The warranties proposed in the amendments to article 4 in § 4-208 (Proposed
Amendments to Article 4, Draft No. 1, Feb. 1, 1990) will cover these cases.
Under this section the depositary bank that manually does the MICR encoding
will warrant the accuracy of its encoding 4-208(1) and, in cases like the three
discussed here, would have liability and, presumably, would be unable, there-
fore, to recover from a payor bank under § 4-302. Thus, the amendments
would affirm the outcome of First National Bank, although for different
reasons, and would reverse the outcome in SOS Oil Corp.
Proposed § 4-207A reads:
Encoding and Retention Warranties.
(1) A person that encodes information on or with respect to an item
after issue warrants to any subsequent collecting or returning bank and
to the payor bank or other payor that the information is correctly encoded.
If the customer of a depositary bank encodes pursuant to agreement with
the depositary bank, that bank also makes this warranty.
(2) A person that undertakes to retain an item pursuant to a truncation
agreement warrants to any subsequent collecting bank and to the payor
bank or other payor that retention and presentment of the item comply
with the truncation agreement. If a customer of a depositary bank
undertakes to retain an item pursuant to agreement with the depositary
bank, that bank also makes this warranty.
(3) A person to whom the warranties are made under this section may
recover from the warrantor as damages for breach of warranty an amount
equal to the loss suffered as a result of the breach, plus interest losses
and expenses incurred as a result of the breach.
(4) Unless a claim for breach of warranty is made within 30 days after
the claimant has reason to know of the breach and identity of the
warrantor, the warrantor is discharged to the extent of any loss caused
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credits the proper account, debits another, and sends the check
toward its apparent payor. Thereafter, the check may never
again be manually handled. This MICR encoding is now universal
and means that there is usually no human intervention in the
transfer of funds after the check goes through the first step in
the process at the depositary bank.
A second recent change is the imposition of dollar cutoffs
below which banks do not examine drawers' signatures. Although
banks do not advertise this behavior, few banks now check all
signatures.4 Failure to check signatures is a direct response to
the volume and to the need for speed, but that omission, of
course, removes all possibility with respect to such checks that
a forgery will be discovered by comparing the signature on the
check with the true signature of the depositor.
A third event is check truncation. Truncation is the destruction
of the check before it reaches the payor bank. Currently
truncation is practiced by many credit unions which hire banks
to collect their checks and which allow the banks to destroy the
checks and send the information to the credit union electronically.
Almost certainly truncation will spread to banks generally and
then turn upstream to occur at the depositary bank. In the
twenty-first century, checks will be photographed and then
destroyed at the depositary bank and all of the information will
be transmitted only electronically. 5
Each of these three events speeds the transaction, but each
diminishes the possibility that a human being will intervene to
distinguish between a legitimate and a fraudulent transfer.
Projecting this experience into the future, we can predict that
by the delay in making the claim.
(5) A cause of action for breach of warranty under this section accrues
when the claimant has reason to know of the breach.
4. American Bankers Association, National Operations/Automation Sur-
vey 1986 119, table 35E (1987). Of the 3,400 banks surveyed in a 1987 banking
study, only 52.4% with assets of less than $100 million verify signatures on
all checks before payment. This percentage decreases dramatically as the assets
of the banks grow; only 1% of banks with assets of $5,000 million or more
verify all signatures before payment.
5. Ultimately it may be possible electronically to transmit a picture of
the check in some form to the depositor, but the day of seeing the actual
check will be long gone.
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the damage wreaked by Goldstein's curse will grow, not diminish,
and that those in charge of the payment system will have
difficulty merely to maintain the system's current ability to
distinguish legitimate from fraudulent transactions.
II. FOUR EXAMPLES
Before I examine the legal doctrines that allocate the losses
arising from Goldstein's curse, I will finish Goldstein's story
and describe three other common frauds to give an appreciation
of the scope and nature of the problem.
The civil debris left by Goldstein's crime fell at the feet of
Judge Haight in the Southern District of New York. In United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of New
York ("Union Trust"),6 Union Trust argued that the various
collecting banks downstream from it, namely PNB, Albany
State, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York were agents
and were liable to it under section 4-202 for negligent handling
of the $880,000 Goldstein check. They also argued that First
Pennsylvania had liability for holding the check beyond its
midnight deadline. Judge Haight rejected all of those arguments
and left the loss on Union Trust.
7
The Judge rejected the invitation to apply a comparative
negligence standard. Rather, he applied section 3-406 by analogy
to the behavior of Union Trust. Union Trust had done a variety
of acts with respect to Goldstein and the Goldstein check which
showed it to be a "substantial contributor to the loss." In the
first place, the teller failed to put a hold on the $880,000 check
of the kind that the bank procedures normally required.' In the
second place, the Bank's own check processing machine spit out
the check because the letters at the bottom were not magnetically
encoded. Despite its obvious deficiencies (the numerals were not
6. 590 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), 620 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd, 786 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1986). For other MICR fraud cases, see Northpark
Nat'l Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 572 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Citizen's
State Bank v. Martin, 227 Kan. 580, 609 P.2d 670 (1980).
7. 590 F. Supp. at 494-99.
8. Id. at 492-93. As the normal hold would have expired before May 15,
the failure to comply with this procedure probably had no impact on the
outcome.
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only not MICR encoded, but they were the wrong size and
shape), the check was sent on for manual collection. Union
Trust failed to record Goldstein's alleged banking association in
New York and so was unable to check on it. Had it inquired
with the New York banking reference, there Union Trust would
have found no knowledge of Goldstein. When it did check with
credit bureaus and with First Pennsylvania, it was told there
was no account in the name of the drawer on the $880,000
check and that the credit bureaus had no knowledge of Goldstein.
Finally, the bank officer should have been put on notice when
Goldstein appeared at the bank with an expensive bottle of
champagne to speed the bank's approval of his withdrawal of
the funds.
The assistant branch manager who ultimately authorized the
wire transfer, on May 15, apparently believed that the check
had been paid because the Union Trust computer treated the
funds as "collected." Evidently that employee did not realize
that the fact that an item is shown as "collected" in the
computer memory does not mean that final payment has occurred,
but is merely a reflection of an assumption that is itself built
into the computer program about the expected time it should
take for the final payment of a check. For all of these reasons,
Union Trust was properly regarded as far more negligent than
any other party in the transaction; surely it was the least cost-
risk avoider in this case and should have borne the loss.
That was exactly the outcome that Judge Haight required. He
did so by applying 3-406 by analogy to the behavior of Union
Trust. He commented as follows:
The depositary bank, like the drawer of the check, is well situated
to protect the system against MICR fraud. The depositary bank
has an opportunity to examine the check free of time pressures
which prevent collecting banks from giving checks more than a
cursory glance. Perhaps more important, the depositary bank is
in the unique position of being able to examine both the depositor
and the check. No other bank in the collecting chain can examine
the depositor, a crucial advantage given the seeming difficulty of
detecting this type of fraud. 9
9. 620 F. Supp. at 372.
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The Judge pointed out that there may be cases of MICR fraud
in which the depositary bank should not bear the loss but where
the collecting bank should be liable under section 4-202.'0
My second example deals with a most ancient and common
form of check theft-forging the drawer's signature. This case
shows the impact of the curse even on conventional frauds. In
Medford Irrigation District v. Western Bank," a bookkeeper
forged the name of her employer on a number of checks which
were cashed at the defendant bank. For the purpose of summary
judgment, the plaintiff conceded its negligence in not supervising
the bookkeeper, not auditing the accounts, and in failing to
review the bank statements. It also conceded that its negligence
substantially contributed to the forgeries.12 Nevertheless, plaintiff
argued that the bank did not follow "reasonable commercial
banking standards" or exercise "ordinary care" because it failed
to examine signatures on checks for amounts of less than $5,000.
The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment for the
plaintiff. Because it found the bank to be negligent, it ruled
that the depositor's negligence in supervising the embezzler was
irrelevant. 3
Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Zapata Corp. 14
is indistinguishable from Medford Irrigation, but the First Circuit
comes to the opposite conclusion. There, an embezzler stole a
number of blank checks from Zapata, forged its signature and
entered amounts between $150 and $800 on each check. Between
10. Id. First Pennsylvania escaped its apparent liability for holding the
check beyond its midnight deadline on the ground that Union Trust was
estopped from making such a claim against First Pennsylvania. Recall that
First Pennsylvania had responded that there was no account at its bank in
the name of the named drawer, and the court found that that message given
to Union Trust early in the transaction estopped Union Trust from later
claiming final payment. Id. at 373. The court also suggested that it might
have reached the same result on the ground that First Pennsylvania could
have recovered the money on a restitution theory, as Union Trust did not
change its position in reliance upon final payment.
On the latter point the court may be on shaky ground. If First Pennsylvania
had stopped payment during the day of May 15, some or all of the money
might have been kept out of Goldstein's hands.
11. 66 Or. App. 589, 676 P.2d 329 (1984).
12. Id. at 589, 676 P.2d at 331.
13. Id. at 590, 676 P.2d at 334.
14. 848 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1988).
606 [Vol. 21
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March and July 1985, the payor paid $109,247.16 of these forged
checks. Relying on section 4-406, the court of appeals affirmed
a judgment for the bank as to the checks presented for payment
more than two weeks after Zapata had received the first bank
statement reflecting the forgeries.15 A banking expert testified
that most banks do not examine drawers' signatures on checks
under a certain dollar amount; he also testified that this practice
had not caused any significant increase in forgery losses. The
court concluded that such behavior was not negligent.
In concluding that the payor's failure to examine was not
negligent, the court made explicit reference to Judge Hand's
famous definition of "duty" in United States v. Carrol Towing
Co.' 6 There, Judge Hand recognized that one can fail to take
certain plausible and possible precautions and yet not be negligent
because of such failure if the burden of precaution is large
compared with the gravity of the harm and the probability of
its occurrence.
What is new about Rhode Island Trust and Medford Irrigation
is not the acts of the embezzlers; it is the acts of the banks.
The increased volume of checks handled by every bank has
caused virtually all banks to abandon the practice of examining
signatures on every check. 7 The differing outcomes in these two
cases exactly demonstrate the differing responses to Goldstein's
curse.
My third case is a common theft that has been described in
appellate decisions for more than 100 years.' 8 An unfaithful
corporate employee first procures a proper corporate signature
on a check payable to the order of a bank. The thief then
deposits the check in his own account at that bank or receives
cash on the check's presentation. 9 Bank employees are
accustomed to treating checks payable to their bank as though
they are payable to cash, and recognize them as a means by
which depositors withdraw their own funds. Routinely, therefore,
tellers and bank operations employees follow the instructions of
persons in possession of such checks because they confuse this
15. Id. at 292-95.
16. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
17. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
18. See Sims v. United States Trust Co., 103 N.Y. 472, 9 N.E. 605 (1886).
19. See id. at 474.
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fraudulent use of the check with its legitimate use. Here the
thief takes advantage not of the computer's ignorance, but of
the ignorance of the bank employees.
J. Gordon Neely Enterprises Inc. v. American National Bank
of Huntsville0 is illustrative of these cases. In that case, a
Huntsville Midas Muffler shop was operated by the Neelys. In
1976, the Neelys hired Louise Bradshaw as a Kelly Girl. Louise
stayed on to help Mrs. Neely learn how to "keep the corporate
books. ' 21 Among other things, Louise suggested that the Neelys
open a bank account at American National Bank and that funds
be put in that account by checks drawn on their regular account
at First Alabama. The American National account was to be
used for payroll and certain other purposes. In 1977, Louise
Bradshaw made out nineteen different checks payable to the
order of American National Bank for the signature of Mrs.
Neely. Louise left large gaps to the left of the amount written
on the designated line, but Mrs. Neely signed them anyway.
Louise would then add a digit or two to the left of the original
amount or raise the first digit by using liquid erasure. She then
made a split deposit at American National by putting the original
amount into Neely's American National payroll account and
depositing the rest into her own account. Louise saw to it that
she got possession of the checks when they were returned to the
Midas Shop and she covered up her defalcation by again using
liquid erasure on the checks to return them to the original
amount and by reconciling the accounts by herself or doing so
with Mrs. Neely in a way in which Mrs. Neely never saw the
statements.
When a new accountant was hired in the latter part of 1977,
he quickly discovered embezzlements of $17,005.18. The Neelys
sued American National for conversion. 2  They argued that,
although the bank had been directed to make payment to itself
("pay to bank" the checks had said), instead it had paid more
than $17,000 to Louise Bradshaw. Relying upon the bank's
expert testimony to the effect that banks normally treat such
checks as "payable to the order of cash," the court treated the
20. 403 So. 2d 887 (Ala. 1981).
21. Id. at 888.
22. Id. at 889.
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checks as bearer paper and found American National neither
negligent nor guilty of conversion.
23
There is no explicit provision in the current versions of articles
3 or 4 that deals with cases like Neely. The majority of the
courts have disagreed with the Neely outcome and have concluded
that the bank should bear liability for its failure to follow the
customer's order.24
The case demonstrates that Goldstein's curse is not merely a
problem of rigid and unintelligent computers, but inheres also
in the inability of human actors with limited skill and
understanding to distinguish honest from fraudulent transactions.
Louise Bradshaw-and many before her and many to come-
instinctively appreciate that the meaning which a bank teller or
the bank operations person places on a check payable to the
"order of the bank" is different from the meaning that a lawyer
or a sophisticated banker might apply to that same instrument.
To the low-level employee, that check means "pay this amount
as the bearer says." To the lawyer (and sometimes to the courts)
it means "pay this amount to the bank and, where that seems
not sensible, investigate."
My fourth and final case shows that the most modern
transactions are at least as susceptible to the curse as the ancient
ones are. It involves an electronic funds transfer. In this case,
the thief instructs a bank (over the forged signature of the
depositor, the true owner of the account) to make payment to
23. Id. at 890-91.
24. See generally Bullitt County Bank v. Publishers Printing, 684 S.W.2d
289 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); Bank of S. Maryland v. Robertson's Crab House,
Inc., 39 Md. App. 707, 389 A.2d 388 (1978); Sun 'n Sand, Inc. v. United
California Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 582 P.2d 920 (1978);
Wright v. Mechanic's Bank, 466 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Pacific
Indem. Co. v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 248 Cal. App. 2d 75, 56 Cal. Rptr;
142 (1967); City Nat'l Bank v. Louisiana Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 216 Ala.
262, 43 So. 2d 602 (1949); Graham v. Southington Bank & Trust Co., 99
Conn. 494, 121 A. 812 (1923).
For cases holding the customer liable, see generally First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Union Bank & Trust, 291 N.W.2d 282 (S.D. 1980); Johnson v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 30 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 334 N.E.2d 295 (1975); Richardson
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 504 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Martin v.
First Nat'l Bank, 358 Mo. 1199, 219 S.W.2d 312 (1949); Mayo Bros. Chem.
Corp. v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 192 Miss. 293, 5 So. 2d 220 (1941); Griffin v.
Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 246 S.W. 180 (Mo. 1922).
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its own depositor but into a numerically identified account at
another bank. The success of this fraud depends upon the
sending bank's necessary ignorance of the significance of the
account number at the receiving bank. It is aided by the fact
that the sending bank regards the transfer merely as the shifting
of funds by its own depositor to an account at another bank
also owned by the same depositor. Finally, it depends upon the
knowledge that the employee at the receiving bank will disregard
the name on the incoming message and the name on its account
and will simply deposit funds into the account at its bank whose
number corresponds with the number on the electronic funds
message. In effect, the thief understands that the outbound
message will be treated as a message identified by name and
that the inbound message will be treated as a message identified
by number.
In Bradford Trust Co. of Boston v. Texas American Bank-
Houston,2 two persons using the names of Hank and Dave
Friedman sent a forged letter and a stock power to Bradford
Trust, the agent for a mutual fund. This letter directed the
liquidation of $800,000 from the mutual fund account of Frank
Rochefort. The authors of the letter instructed Bradford to wire
the $800,000 to the account of Frank Rochefort, account number
057141, in the Texas American Bank-Houston. Bradford
instructed its bank, State Street Bank of Boston, to wire the
funds to Texas American, and it did. The employee at Texas
American ignored Rochefort's name26 and put the $800,000 in
account number 057141. That account belonged to Colonial
Coins, not to Frank Rochefort.
Prior to the receipt of the funds, the Friedmans had arranged
to buy coins worth $800,000 and had told Colonial they would
soon be depositing the purchase price in Colonial's account at
Texas American. When the money appeared in its account,
Colonial released the coins and the Friedmans disappeared with
them. Here we see a variation on the curse that combines
elements of the "pay to the order of the bank" transaction and
the MICR encoding fraud. The thieves anticipated that the
transmitting party would be put at ease by the fact that their
25. 790 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1986).
26. Id. at 408. Rochefort was in fact misspelled as "Rochnefort" on the
message.
610 [Vol. 21
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own customer Rochefort was to be the recipient of the money.
Moreover, they anticipated that neither Bradford nor State Street
Bank could easily find out the true owner of the account
numbered 057141 at a Houston bank. They also anticipated that
the machine operator in the basement of the Houston bank
would identify the recipient by number and number only. Because
that operator would be doing hundreds of such transactions per
hour, they assumed that she would not take the time to compare
the name on account number 057141 and the name of the
intended recipient on the incoming message. Thus, the system
treats the outbound message as one for Rochefort and the
inbound message as one for 057141.
In Bradford Trust, the trial court applied the Texas comparative
negligence statute and apportioned the loss equally between
Bradford and Texas American Bank.2 7 Both banks appealed;
each argued that the other should bear the entire loss. The
appellate court concluded that the loss should fall on Bradford
Trust Company of Boston because it had failed to follow its
own procedures, procedures that would have stopped the loss
had they been followed. 28 Because of an earlier fraud, Bradford
had a procedure requiring that requests for wire transfers of
large dollar amounts be verified by a senior supervisor at the
bank. Bradford's procedure apparently also required a phone
call to Rochefort, which, of course, would have uncovered the
fraud. 29 The court also noted that Bradford had dealt with the
thieves, but Texas American had dealt only with its own customer,
Colonial Coin.
The court's reasoning about who could most easily avoid the
loss, therefore who should bear it, seems persuasive. Like Judge
Haight in the Union Trust case, the court makes a sensible and
conventional judgment about who could most easily have avoided
the loss.30 Moreover, the court properly declined to find that
the sender of the message should always bear the loss as opposed
to the recipient. Under Bradford Trust, it would always be open
27. Id. at 407-08.
28. Id. at 411.
29. Id. at 410. The court also relied upon some early Texas cases and
suggests that its judgment is supported by the policy of finality embodied in
U.C.C. § 3-418 (1987). Id. The latter suggestion seems unpersuasive to me.
30. See id. at 411.
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to the sender in a later case to argue that the receiver of the
message was the one most at fault.
III. WHAT THE DRAFTERS HAVE PROPOSED
The specific problems that I have suggested above are well
known to commercial lawyers, and a fortiori to the bright
commercial lawyers who are drafters of the newly proposed
article 4A and of the amendments to articles 3 and 4.31 It is not
surprising, therefore, to find that three of the four specific
problems that I have suggested are dealt with in these
amendments. First, I will discuss the specific sections in article
4A and in the amendments to articles 3 and 4 that will touch
upon each of the four examples that I have suggested. Then I
will raise the question whether those responses are the wisest
and most sensible responses that could be made to these problems.
Specifically, I will address the question whether the drafters
should behave like repairmen who replace a shock absorber and
an occasional bent A-arm or whether they should design a new
vehicle with stronger A-arms and better shock absorbers.
Recall that Judge Haight applied section 3-406 by analogy to
Union Trust. Section 3-406 is usually used to estop a payee or
a drawer from proving that his signature is not his own because
he "substantially contributed" to the making of the forgery.
That section did not apply to Union Trust for its signature was
not forged; yet the court used the section by analogy. I see
nothing in the amendments to article 4 and in article 4A that
would directly apply to the Union Trust case.32 If the case were
31. Article 4A has been approved by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute. It is
currently being considered by the state legislatures.
The amendments to article 3 have been approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws but have not yet been considered
by the American Law Institute.
The amendments to article 4 have not yet been approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
32. As I read the proposed § 4-208 (warranty on encoding), it fails to
reach the Union Trust case for two reasons. First, § 4-208(1) is a warranty
made only by "a person that encodes information" or made by a depositary
bank whose customer encodes information pursuant to agreement. In the
Union Trust case there was no encoding by Union Trust, nor any according
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to arise again, a bank in Union Trust's position could assert
the same claims against the downstream banks for negligence
under 4-202, just as Union Trust did. If the court concluded
that Union Trust should bear the loss, it would have to go
through almost the same kind of analysis that Judge Haight
used in that case.
There is, however, one twist in the proposed amendments;
they incorporate a rule of comparative negligence. Proposed
section 3-406 provides that the "loss is allocated between the
person precluded and the person asserting the preclusion according
to the extent to which the failure of each to exercise ordinary
care contributed to the loss." 33 If the judge were to apply section
3-406, by analogy under that regime, presumably he would have
to determine whether the New York Federal Reserve, the Albany
State Bank, the Philadelphia National Bank, or First Pennsylvania
Bank had "substantially" contributed to the loss and, if they
had, allocate a percentage of the loss to them. Beyond that
change in section 3-406, the amendments leave the judge free
to reason by analogy and give him little or no guidance.
The second example, the forged signature dispute illustrated
by Rhode Island Hospital Trust and Medford Irrigation District,
is explicitly resolved by section 4-406(6) that reads as follows:
Whether the bank failed to exercise ordinary care is determined
by reasonable banking standards at the time and place where the
to agreement by Goldstein. Secondly, § 4-208 would not reach the Union
Trust case because the check was forwarded for manual handling after Union
Trust itself had discovered the MICR encoding could not be read by its
machine. Forwarding an item for manual handling would take it completely
out of the MICR encoding system and would foreclose the possibility of a
subsequent bank being misled by the MICR encoding.
Note that § 4-208 might govern in a case in which the depositary bank put
the check in an envelope and then manually MICR encoded the fractional
number on the bottom of the envelope to allow the check to be sent elec-
tronically. In that case, the depositary bank undertakes the responsibility of
entering the proper numbers.
Once the system completely refuses to handle checks manually, § 4-208 will
cover a larger percentage of the cases and will properly put the burden on
the depositary bank to do the correct investigation and to enter the correct
numbers.
33. U.C.C. § 3-406 (Proposed Amendment to Article 3, Feb. 1, 1990).
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check was paid. Reasonable banking standards do not require a
payor bank to examine an item that is processed for payment by
automated means if the failure to examine did not violate the
bank's prescribed procedures and the bank's procedures do not
vary unreasonably from reasonable procedures followed by com-
parable banks.3"
The proposed comment three explicitly refers to the two cases
and states that it is rejecting the latter and adopting the rule of
the former.
The third example involving the "pay to bank" case is
apparently resolved by the addition of a new section 3-307, 35
Notice of Breach of Fiduciary Duty. Section 3-307(d) states that
one who takes a check from a fiduciary (including an agent)
has notice of a breach of a fiduciary's duty, if, among other
34. U.C.C. § 4-406(b) reprinted in THE NEW U.C.C., supra note 2, at
267.
35. U.C.C. § 3-306 reprinted in Tm NEW U.C.C., supra note 2, at 159.
(1) This section applies if (i) an instrument is taken from a fiduciary
for payment or collection or for value, (ii) the taker has knowledge of
the fiduciary status of the fiduciary, and (iii) the represented person makes
a claim to the instrument or its proceeds on the basis that the transaction
of the fiduciary is a breach of fiduciary duty. Notice of breach of fiduciary
duty by the fiduciary is notice of the claim of the represented person.
"Fiduciary" means an agent, trustee, partner, corporation officer or
director, or other representative owing a fiduciary duty with respect to
the instrument. "Represented person" means the principal, beneficiary,
partnership, corporation, or other person to whom the duty is owed.
(2) If the instrument is payable to the fiduciary, as such, or to the
represented person, the taker has notice of the breach of fiduciary duty
if the instrument is (i) taken in payment of or as security for a debt
known by the taker to be the personal debt of the fiduciary, (ii) taken in
a transaction known by the taker to be for the personal benefit of the
fiduciary, or (iii) deposited to an account other than an account of the
fiduciary, as such, or an account of the represented person.
(3) If the instrument is made or drawn by the fiduciary, as such,
payable to the fiduciary personally, the taker does not have notice of the
breach of fiduciary duty unless the taker of the breach of fiduciary duty.
(4) If the instrument is made or drawn by or on behalf of the repre-
sented person to the taker as payee, the taker has notice of the breach
of fiduciary duty if the instrument is (i) taken in payment of or as security
for a debt known by the taker to be the personal debt of the fiduciary,
(ii) taken in a transaction known by the taker to be for the personal
benefit of the fiduciary, or (iii) deposited to an account other than an
account of the fiduciary, as such, or an account of the represented person.
[Vol. 21
HeinOnline  -- 21 U. Tol. L. Rev. 614 1989-1990
GOLDSTEIN'S CURSE
things, the check is "deposited to an account other than the
account of the fiduciary, as such, or an account of a represented
person." Untwisted, this means that if a thief deposits the check
to his personal account-as opposed to an account held "as"
agent or trustee-it is not deposited to an account of the
fiduciary "as such" and the very deposit in the personat account
gives notice to the bank of the breach of duty. Because the
bank is on notice of the breach of the fiduciary duty, it cannot
be a holder in due course and it is presumably left open to the
claims of the true owner of the money, namely, those of the
thief's employer.
Name and number conflicts are dealt with explicitly in section
4A-305. That section authorizes the receiving bank to "treat the
person identified by number as the beneficiary of the order, if
the bank does not know that the name and number identify
different persons." Although there are some other qualifications
to the rule and some uncertainties inherent in it, the rule
generally puts the burden on the sender of an electronic message,
not on the receiver. Basically it authorizes the receiver of an
electronic message to cast a blind eye on the name and to rely
exclusively on the account number. Presumably that is exactly
what receiving banks will do henceforth and the burden will fall
on the sender, not on the receiving bank.
36
To give the drafters their due, I should point out that they
have responded to certain aspects of Goldstein's curse in other,
somewhat more expansive, ways. For example, sections 4A-202
and 4A-203 authorize a bank and its customer to establish
commercially reasonable security procedures. With limited
exceptions, those provisions allow the enforcement of even
fraudulent transfer orders that are made in compliance with
those security procedures. The rules embodied in sections 4A-
36. There are some qualifications on the rule as I have stated it. For
example, if the receiver "knows" that the name and number identify different
persons, then the outcome will be different. Also a different rule would apply
if the beneficiary's bank has "otherwise agreed." Section 4A-305(3) contem-
plates that the loss will often be placed on the "originator" and not on the
originator's bank. Normally the bank can insure that the loss will go back up
to the customer by "informing" the customer that "payment of payment
orders issued by the originator might be made by the beneficiary's bank on
the basis of an identifying or bank account number even if it identifies a
person different from the named beneficiary." U.C.C. § 4A-305(3).
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202 and 4A-203 are as close as the drafters come to a general
recognition of the problems associated with the curse and, in
my view, the rules that are set out are the correct ones.
With the exception of sections 4A-202 and 4A-203, I think it
is fair to say that the drafters' actions are more in the nature
of repairs, replacement of shock absorbers, not in the form of
redesign of the A-arms. The dispute between those who seek to
minimize costs by mere repair and those who seek grand
improvement at higher risk occurs everywhere. There are, of
course, good arguments on both sides of the repair or redesign
argument, and I am not certain that I am right and that the
drafters are wrong.
IV. WHAT THE LAW SHOULD BE
In conclusion, I turn to an evaluation of article 4A and of
the proposed amendments to articles 3 and 4 as those proposals
apply to Goldstein's curse. As one will see, I have one significant
criticism and I accuse the drafters of a few peccadilloes.
To evaluate the response of article 4A and the new amendments
to Goldstein's curse, I begin with three assumptions. If any of
these is incorrect, my criticisms of article 4A and of the
amendments to articles 3 and 4 are also defective.
My first assumption is that Learned Hand was right. I assume
that society is best served by placing losses on those who could
best have avoided them. I believe that we should not label one
as negligent merely because he could avoid a loss at some price.
We should compare the cost of avoidance with the probability
of occurrence and the magnitude of the injury. I assume that
placing the loss on the lowest cost-risk avoider will cause that
person to take the most appropriate steps to avoid or minimize
it and those steps would be less expensive by hypothesis than
those that could or would be taken by others. Therefore, I
assume that the overall cost to society of Goldstein's curse will
be minimized by placing all or most of the losses associated
with it on the one who could least expensively prevent those
losses.
Second, I assume that the curse cannot be exorcised. I assume
that speed and high volume in a payment system is antithetical
to reflective intelligence. I assume that the number and amount
of payments will grow in more or less its current form, but
with paper gradually giving way to electronics. I assume,
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therefore, that the system's day-to-day supervision will be in the
hands of persons who understand only a small part of the
process and who are largely unskilled and unsophisticated except
in the operation of their own small parts of the larger system.
I assume that an increasing share of all transfers will be without
human intervention of any kind, accomplished by computers,
by MICR encoding and by the reading of electronic messages.
Therefore, I assume that the opportunity for the Goldsteins and
others will grow, not shrink.
Third, I assume that the person who can most cheaply avoid
tie losses is nearly always someone outside the banking system
or at its margins. In the embezzlement case, I assume that the
employer of the embezzler can almost always avoid the loss at
lower cost, by hiring and supervising the employee, by examining
the check statements, and by maintaining sensible business
practices.
Where, as in Goldstein's own case, the thief is not an embezzler,
it is more difficult to predict who can most easily avoid the
loss. Surely Judge Haight's judgment is persuasive that Union
Trust was the villain in Goldstein's case, but one can imagine
other cases, done by more clever thieves than Goldstein, where
it might be a Federal Reserve or a collecting bank who could
most easily discover the loss.37 Because the bank's pockets will
often be the deepest and it the most obvious object of the
37. See Northpark Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 572 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y.
1983). In this case, the thief used a check on which the MICR routing number
was that of Bankers Trust Co. in New York, but the face of the check listed
the Bank of Detroit as the payor bank. He deposited the $62,500 check on
November 7, 1979 in a Dallas bank at which he had an account. The Dallas
bank put a 14-day hold on the check and presented it to its correspondent
bank which in turn presented it to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
for collection.
On November 13, the check was presented to Bankers Trust for collection.
After some undetermined period of time, Bankers Trust realized that the
check was not drawn on one of its accounts and Bankers Trust sent it back
to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The Federal Reserve Bank of New
York then relied on the Bank of Detroit heading on the check and sent it to
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago stamped the check on November 20.
At some point, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago sent the check to its
Detroit branch where it was established that there is no Bank of Detroit. At
this point, the check went back through the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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court's disapproval, I fear a natural inclination of some courts
to put the loss on the banking system in the misguided notion
that the banks can most easily avoid the loss and most easily
spread it among their customers.
If one accepts my three assumptions, that losses will be
minimized by putting them on the lowest cost-risk avoider, that
Goldstein's curse cannot be exorcised, and the persons outside
the banking system are most often the least cost-risk avoiders,
one can find significant fault with article 4A and with the
proposed amendments to articles 3 and 4.
First, consider three peccadilloes. As I have indicated above,
section 3-307 would appear to decree that the depositor is the
winner and the bank the loser in the "pay to bank" check case
described above in Neely. One reaches this conclusion because
3-307 states that the bank is ipso facto on notice and, having
notice, is not a holder in due course. Presumably, therefore, it
is open to the claims of the true owner of the check for
conversion. If the three assumptions under which I am proceeding
are correct, this section will sometimes absolutely foreclose the
correct outcome. In cases like Neely, I assume that the operator
of the Midas Muffler Shop who deals with the embezzler on a
day-to-day basis, who fails to use proper business practices, and
who would know of the embezzlement with only ten seconds'
examination of the bank statement, is the least cost-risk avoider.
He is the one who should bear the loss-just as the court held
in Neely. To the extent that section 3-307 invariably places the
loss on the bank, I believe it is wrong.
On the other hand, I would not argue that the customer
should always bear the loss in these cases. There may be many
cases in which there are only a limited number of checks involved
and, eventually, ended up at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on
November 29. The depositary bank finally received notice of non-payment
some time in early December. Id. at 527.
Meanwhile, on November 21, the thief had tested the waters by making a
$9,000 withdrawal. After the first withdrawal went off without a hitch, the
thief returned on November 24 and withdrew $40,250. Needless to say he has
not been seen since the last withdrawal. Id.
The Dallas bank brought suit against the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, and Bankers Trust. The only
reported litigation resulted in the dismissal of two of the four claims against
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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and in which the procedures of the customer are adequate. In
such cases, the bank may well be the one who should bear the
loss as many courts have found in cases analogous to Neely.3"
The second peccadillo lies in sections 4A-204 and 4A-304.
Each of these deals with the duty of the customer or sender to
report unauthorized (4A-204) or erroneously executed (4A-304)
payment orders. 39 Unlike section 4-406, where the customer bears
at least his share of the loss if he fails to examine the bank
statements and make timely reports, these sections give the
38. See supra note 24.
39. U.C.C. § 4A-204, reprinted in Te NEW U.C.C., supra note 2, at 308.
This section reads:
Refund of Payment and Duty of Customer to Report With Respect to
Unauthorized Payment Order.
If a receiving bank accepts a payment order issued in the name of its
customer as sender which is (i) not authorized and not effective as the
order of the customer under Section 4A-202, or (ii) not enforceable, in
whole or in part, against the customer under Section 4A-203, the bank
shall refund any payment of the payment order received from the customer
to the extent the bank is not entitled to enforce payment, and shall pay
interest on the refundable amount calculated from the date the bank
received payment to the date of the refund. However, if the customer
fails to exercise ordinary care to determine that the order was not
authorized by the customer and to advise the bank of the relevant facts
within a reasonable time not to exceed 90 days from the date the customer
received notification from the bank that the order was accepted or that
the customer's account was debited with respect to the order, the customer
is not entitled to interest from the bank on the amount to be refunded.
The bank is not entitled to any recovery from the customer on account
of a failure by the customer to give notification as stated in this section.
The sender's erroneously executed payment "order is stated." U.C.C. § 4A-
304. This section reads:
If the sender of a payment order that is erroneously executed as stated
in Section 4A-303 receives notification from the receiving bank that the
order was executed or that the sender's account was debited with respect
to the order, the sender has a duty to exercise ordinary care to determine,
on the basis of information available to the sender, that the order was
erroneously executed and to advise the bank of the relevant facts within
a reasonable time not to exceed 90 days after the notification from the
bank was received by the sender. If the sender fails to perform that duty,
the bank is not obliged to pay interest on any amount that is refundable
to the sender under subsection (4) of Section 4A-402 for the period before
the bank learns of the execution error. The bank is not entitled to any
recovery from the sender on account of a failure by the sender to perform
the duty stated in this section.
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customer a mere slap on the hands. They deprive the customer
of interest on the amount that was erroneously or improperly
debited, yet they permit the negligent customer to recover the
principal amount. If the customer is obliged to examine his
statement that shows the payment of checks and if his failure
to report improper payments shown on such statements renders
him liable for subsequent withdrawals, I fail to understand why
a similar obligation should not be imposed on the- customer
where the payment is done electronically. Indeed, with check
truncation-where even check transfers are concluded
electronically-any justification for a distinction for a different
rule in sections 4-406 and 4A-204 and 4A-304 is more uncertain.
In many such cases the customer will surely be the least cost-
risk avoider and in such cases he should report the altered check
to the bank or suffer the consequences.
My third complaint, and one that I assert with less confidence
than the others, has to do with the introduction of a comparative
negligence standard in sections 3-406 and 4-406. On the one
hand, these rules may facilitate the allocation of losses arising
out of the curse in ways consistent with my argument. Under
the current sections 3-406 and 4-406, the bank can throw the
loss back on the customer only if the bank itself is not
contributorily negligent. If the bank failed to follow reasonable
commercial standards or was contributorily negligent, it throws
none of the loss on the customer; it bears it all. Comparative
negligence standards will almost certainly permit the allocation
of a larger share of the loss to the customer than is true under
the current regime. Given my view about who is most likely at
fault in such cases, I indorse that outcome. That is a virtue of
the comparative negligence standard.
Yet, I have a fear about the practical effect of the comparative
negligence standard. It is possible that the standard will cause
allocation of some losses away from the least cost-risk avoider
and contrary to what I have above predicted. Would courts in
cases such as Rhode Island Trust be more likely to find that a
bank (which had failed to examine any signature under a certain
dollar amount) was itself partly at fault and so had
"substantially" contributed to the loss and thus should bear
some part of it? If that is true, the power of the loss allocation
system to stimulate socially appropriate behavior will be
diminished and the dead weight loss arising from litigation will
be further increased by the hope of transferring some of the
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loss to those who are now regarded as not at all at fault. In
effect, I suggest that the use of a comparative allocation rule
may have the unintended consequence of also changing the
standards by which one measures negligence, that it may have
the consequence of altering the Learned Hand calculus and of
imposing duties where before none existed. That, of course, is
not the purpose of a comparative standard, but it is plausible
to think that it could have that consequence.
One other fault in the comparative negligence standard lies in
its potential for stimulating litigation where none would now
exist. If there are now many cases that are settled without
litigation because one party finds itself hopelessly at fault and
understands that it will bear the entire loss, and if those cases
would be litigated in a comparative negligence regime out of a
hope of recovering at least a part of the loss, the comparative
negligence standard may bring with it a dead weight loss in the
form of litigation expense that will outweigh its virtues. Whether
that will happen is impossible to predict. The data on the impact
of comparative negligence on the torts system in this respect are
equivocal. 4°
My final and most serious complaint is one that probably
could have been directed at the drafting committee of each of
the articles of the Uniform Commercial Code and certainly at
the drafters of every set of amendments to any of the articles.
That is the complaint that there is no explicit rule that deals
with the problems posed by Goldstein's curse when none of the
specific rules apply. The drafters should be applauded for their
recognition of specific issues in sections such as the amendments
to sections 3-406 and 4-406. Indeed, in sections 4A-202 and 4A-
203, the drafters have come quite close to a general recognition
of the problems arising from the curse, at least in electronic
40. See Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and
After" Survey, 13 ARK. L. REv. 89, 98-100 (1959). This study sought to
examine the effect of Arkansas' "pure" comparative negligence statute on
judicial administration in that state. The results indicated that the comparative
negligence rule did prompt attorneys to accept more cases than they had under
the contributory negligence rule. Thus, it appears that more cases will be
actively pursued under the comparative negligence rule. However, the study
also indicated that more cases were settled before they reached the trial stage
under the comparative negligence rule. The result was that roughly the same
number of cases went to trial under either system.
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funds transfer cases. Yet, there is no general rule of default in
article 4A or in the amendments to articles 3 and 4. Worse, the
proposals for the use of comparative negligence in sections 4-
406 and 3-406 may leave the courts confused about the
appropriate analogy. Some courts are likely to conclude that
they should copy sections 3-406 and 4-406; other courts may
follow the direction of section 1-103 into the common law and
so apply traditional rules of negligence and contributory
negligence.
Of course, if the specific sections of articles 3, 4 and 4A have
dealt with every case that could arise from Goldstein's curse,
my concerns are unfounded. To show that that is not so,
consider three cases that are not covered by article 4A or by
the amendments to articles 3 and 4. First is Goldstein's own
case. There Judge Haight refused to allow Union Trust to
recover from the downstream banks under section 4-202 by
applying 3-406 by analogy to Union Trust. Neither the current
section 3-406 nor the proposed reaches the Union Trust case.
No Union Trust signature was at issue and so the bank could
not be estopped to deny its signature. Nothing in the amendments
changes this outcome and even after the amendments a judge
would be called upon to make his own law.
The second case that will soon come to the court, if it has
not already, arises when the sending or receiving bank "helps
along" a fraudulent electronic fund transfer. Assume, for
example, that a thief successfully breaks a security code and
somehow acquires most, but not all of the proper identification
of the depositor's account. The thief then sends a message
instructing a withdrawal (or a deposit if it is done at the receiving
end) to an account numbered 55555. Unbeknownst to the thief,
the sending (or the receiving) bank account contains a letter at
the end of the numerals, i.e., 55555E. Is the sending or receiving
bank who unintentionally assists the thief in committing a fraud
by adding the "E" to the "55555" itself engaged in negligence?
If fraudulent transfers are more likely than non-fraudulent ones
to have small defects and if such defects would put a reasonably
prudent banker on notice, should not the bank be held negligent
and bear the loss? It seems so to me, yet I see nothing in article
4A that would allow that result.
Consider yet another form of apparent negligence practiced
in an actual case that did not come to court. In that case an
American and a group of Colombians-all apparently in the
[Vol. 21
HeinOnline  -- 21 U. Tol. L. Rev. 622 1989-1990
GOLDSTEIN'S CURSE
drug trade-stole several millions of dollars by use of the name-
number discrepancy now covered by section 4A-305. They
ultimately attempted to withdraw the money by appearing en
masse in a foreign, and non-Spanish speaking country, to carry
away their funds in cash in paper bags. According to the
testimony given in that case, the appearance of a wild-eyed
group seeking to take more than $10 million in cash in a paper
bag, would put any reasonable bank on notice of something
amiss. If the bank ignored that notice, should it not bear the
loss? I believe it should, but there is nothing in article 4A that
would allow it.
If anything is certain, it is that the imaginations of honest
lawyers and law professors are much more impoverished than
the imagination of the Goldsteins. Therefore, we can safely
predict that there are frauds now secretly at work and others
soon to occur that are well beyond our imaginations.
41
How should the courts then deal with my three examples and
with the scores of others that Goldstein's curse will present to
the courts over the next twenty years? Are the courts simply to
apply the rules in articles 3, 4 and 4A and to ignore the fact
that those rules require the loss to fall on someone who may
not be the least cost-risk avoider? If not that, then what? Should
the courts apply section 3-406 by analogy? Should they apply
the common law via section 1-103?
Here the drafters have failed us. We need a specific section.
In my view this section should direct the court to place the loss
on the one most seriously at fault who, by hypothesis, could
most cheaply have avoided the loss. I believe that the section
should be supported by commentary that would spell out the
three assumptions that I have above posed.
Absent such a rule, I foresee not only the probability of bad
law, but also of non-uniform law. Because my three assumptions
41. I have recently heard of a check written on disintegrating paper. In
effect this is a variation of Goldstein's ploy. Presumably the depositor puts
the check into his account and receives a provisional credit. The check then
travels to a distant bank and, if things work according to Hoyle, disintegrates
before the payor bank can determine that it is a fraud. Because the check is
never returned, the depositary bank eventually assumes that it has been paid
and allows the thief to withdraw the money. Of course, the fraud will be
discovered when the accounts of the various banks in the system do not
balance, but by then, it will be too late.
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are indorsed only by implication and by inference to be drawn
from sections such as 4A-202 and 4A-203, those rules will not
be obvious to judges who are not as thoughtful as Judge Haight.
Moreover, some courts will erroneously conclude that the banking
system as a whole should bear the loss because they believe that
system is a better risk spreader and because they believe it can
most easily avoid future losses. Finally, even well-intentioned
courts may seize on different elements of different rules and
apply them by analogy. The modest bow to comparative
negligence in sections 3-406 and 4-406 invites this lack of
uniformity.
In conclusion, I applaud the incremental recognition of
Goldstein's curse by the drafters of the amendments to articles
3 and 4 and article 4A. I predict that the system's ability to
distinguish between fraudulent and honest transactions will not
improve and is likely to decline. I believe, therefore, that
Goldstein's curse will be with us for the foreseeable future and
that the civil law problems it will present to the courts will
increase. I hope that I am not a Cassandra and that at least
the courts, if not the drafters, will agree with my three
assumptions and so place the losses arising from Goldstein's
curse on those who can most easily avoid them. And I hope
that is so, even though those losers will most often be persons
outside of or at the margins of the bank payment system.
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